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No. 5779. In Bank. Feb. 
v. ANTHONY Cl'l'RINO, 
Criminal Law- Appeal- Objections- Evidence.- Where a 
criminal case was tried before the Court's decision 
44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d defendant 
from raising on appeal the question that 
obtained evidence was admitted against him though 
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the 
trial. 
Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where the record is 
silent as to whether officers premises and defend-
ant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no evi-
dence illegality of the search, it must be presumed 
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.) 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where 
could have testified to the presence of a conditional 
sales contract without it from the house that was 
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership 
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by 
admission of the contract in evidence. 
See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and § 6 et seq. 
McK. References: § 1079; [2] Searches 
and § 1 [3] Law, § 1382; Criminal Law, 
§ 393(2); Burglary, §§ 25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Wit-
nesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal 
Law,§ 589; [12] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9). 
Witnesses-Cross-examination-Scope.~\Vhere 
examination denies any 
the prosecution can 
him with the burglaries, and it is 
cross-examination how his automobile 
whether he had been in the was 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Cross-
to defendant's 
§ 38; § 74. 
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!d.-Conduct of Counsel.·-Where defendant had testified that 
he left a certain place because the police were looking for him, 
it was not improper for the district attorney to make the obser-
vation that defendant was ''carefully avoiding that address," 
this a reasonable inference from defendant's testimony. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-1n a prosecution for burglary, the 
district statement in his argument to the jury, 
"Here you have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the 
latter part of his years to a life of crime," though improper 
because not supported by evidence, did not constitute re-
versible error where the jury was immediately instructed to 
disregard it and in the light of the whole record it did not 
11ffect the verdict. 
APPE.A.IJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Eustace Cullinan, Jr., 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of sec-
ond degree burglary, affirmed. 
Anthony Citrino, in pro. per., and Robert E. Tarbox, under 
appointment by the District Court of Appeal prior to transfer 
of the appeal, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant .. A.ttorney General, and Raymond M. Mom-
boisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYKOR, J.-Defrendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
two counts of second degree burglary. 
During the eyening of June 3, 1954, or the early morning 
of J nne 4th, the premises of ·william and Frederick Motors 
in San Francisco were burglarized. An automobile, various 
items of garage equipment, a battery, and tools were taken. 
During the evening of J nne 5, J 954, or the early morning 
of June 6th, the premises of Pacific Nash :Motor Sales were 
burglarized. An automobile and a safe containing the com-
pany's records and automobile ownership certificates were 
taken. A few days later defendant sold to Ralph Astengo, 
a service station operator, some of the tools and equipment 
belonging to William and Frederick Motors and their em-
ployees. The sale price of $25 was much below the market 
yalue of the items sold. Defendant told Astengo that the 
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and equipment \Yen~ his and that '' them from 
his father .... '' Astengo requested and receiwd a bill of 
from defendant, who signed it >Yith the name ''Anthony 
'' He returned in about fiye minutes and changed the 
to ''Anthony Cotelli.'' At the trial, however, de-
testified that an acquaintance named Gino Cotelli 
gave him the tools and equipment and that he did not know 
where Cotelli was. ·when arrested he was asked if he had 
sold property under the alias of Cotelli and he refused to 
a!lswer He admitted that he had lived at 345 Second A venue 
in San Francisco under the name of Anthony Colla. He 
tnc:t1r1Pr1 that he shared this house ·with Bill Bragg and Gino 
and that the three of them moved out of the house 
on .rune 17th because an informant told him that Inspector 
Keating of the San Francisco Police Department was looking 
for him and Bragg. Before defendant's arrest, Inspector 
Keating and other officers searched the premises and defend-
ant's automobile, which vvas parked nearby. 'l'hey found 
property taken in both burglaries in the garage and on the 
back porch and in the basement of the house. On a mantel-
together with some of defendant's personal papers, 
found a number of the stolen ownership certificates. On 
9th, tools stolen from \Yilliam and Frederick Motors 
were found in a liquor store in Oakland, following a burglary 
thereof. An automobile purehasec1 by defendant under the 
name of Robert Jennings was parked in a service station 
adjacent to the liquor store. The motor and hood >Yere >Yarm. 
Defendant testified that he g<we the car to Bragg on about 
6th, that he did not commit the burglaries, that the 
property found by the officers at 345 Second A venue was 
there by Cotelli, and that he did not know how the 
certificates got onto the mantelpiece. 
[1] He contends that illegally obtained evidence was ad-
mitte(1 against him. Since this (•ase was tried before our 
(1eeision in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
he is not precluded from raising this question now although 
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the 
trial. (People Y. KitcllcJIS, ante, p. 260 f20-! P.2d 17].) 
[2] The record, however, is silent as to whether the officers 
l1ad a search warrant, and in the absence of any evidence 
showil1g the illegality of the search, we must presume that 
thr officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties. 
( Y. Farrar·a, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21]; Code Civ. 
l'roc., § 1963(1), (15), (33); People v. Serrano, 123 Cal.App. 
[46 C.2d 
contract 




It is novv ' 'settled in this state 
shows criminal disposition, evidence 
which tends and by reasonable inference to establish 
any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any 
material fact to be proved the defense, is admissible 
although it may connect the accused with an offense not in-
cluded in the charge." v. IV oods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509 
P.2d .) Defendant's possession of the stolen 
tools was a material fact, and the evidence that some of the 
tools were found early in the morning in a store under 
circumstances indicating that they had been recently aban-
doned with the fact that defendant's recently driven 
automobile was parked nearby was circumstantial evidence 
that defendant had been in possession of the tools. 
Defendant's main contention is that the evidence is in-
sufficient to the verdict. He argues that there is 
in the record to connect him with the burglaries 
other than the evidence of his sale of some of the stolen prop-
[6] Possession alone of property stolen 
in is not of itself sufficient to sustain the posses-
sor's conviction of that burglary. rrhere must be corroborating 
evidence of conduct, or declarations of the accused 
CUlUH"'"' to show his (People v. Boxer, 137 Cal. 562, 
563-564 
148 
P. People v. Oar1·oll, 79 Cal.App.2d 146, 
P.2d 75].) [7] When possession is shown, how-
the evidence may be slight (People v. 
124 402, 404 [12 P.2d 679] ; People v. Taylor, 
217 [ 40 P.2d 870] ; People v. Russell, 34 
669 [94 P.2d 400] ; People v. Thompson, 
120 Cal.App.2d 359, 363 [260 P.2d 1019] ), and the failure 
to show that possession was honestly obtained is itself a 
289 
V. 
P.2d 500] .) Other corroborative evidence >vas his false 
to Astengo that he received the from 
his father (see People v. Oonracl, 125 185 
P.2d 31] ; People v. Goodall, 104 247 
P.2d 119]; People v. iVlercer, 103 Ca1.App.2cl 789 
P.2d 4] ; People v. Buratti, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 417. 
v. Russell, supra, 34 Cal.App.2d 665, , his 
tools and equipment worth more than $150 for $25 
v. Bttratti, supra, at 419), his using the aliases 
Colla'' and ''Anthony Cotelli'' in making the sale 
v. Buratti, S1ipra, at 419; People v. supra, 
Cal.App. 402, 404), and his testimony that he and the 
moved out of the house on Second Avenue because an 
informant told him that Inspector Keating was looking for 
him and that he bought the automobile found in Oakland 
the name of Robert Jennings because the inspector 
looking for him under the name of Anthony Colla. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court errone-
permitted the district attorney to question him beyond 
the proper limits of cross-examination. (Pen. Code, § 1323.) 
On direct examination defendant denied any participation 
two burglaries charged. On cross-examination he was 
how his automobile got to Oakland and whether he had 
in the vicinity at the time it was found. The questions 
proper, for when a defendant takes the stand and makes 
denial of the crime with which he is the 
yyp,,~,on,nn+"'>' can show circumstances that tend to connect him 
(Peoz?le v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 227-229 [223 P.2d 
[10] Questions relating to defendant's use of false 
azldresses in purchasing the automobile were improper, but 
not have been prejudiced by them, since his use of a 
name at the same time had already properly bPen shown. 
Defendant contends tbat the district attorney was 
of prejudicial misconduct in making an offer of proof 
46 C.2d-10 
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and in his argument to the jury. In attempting to determine 
defendant's reason for flight when he heard that Inspector 
Keating was looking for him, the district attorney asked de-
fendant why he abandoned an automobile at the Second Ave-
nue residence. Upon defendant's objection and the court's 
observation that the examination was somewhat afield, the 
district attorney stated, "'Well, your Honor, the car was 
seen at Second A venue. The man was carefully avoiding that 
address after the burglary.'' The observation that defendant 
was "carefully avoiding that address" was a reasonable in-
ference from defendant's own testimony that he left because 
the police were looking for him, and even if the statement 
that "the car was seen at Second Avenue" was "somewhat 
afield,'' it would not justify a reversal. [12] The district at-
torney's statement in his argument to the jury, "Here yon 
have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the latter part of 
his years to a life of crime" was not supported by the evidence 
and was therefore improper. The jury, however, was im-
mediately instructed to disregard it, and in the light of the 
whole record we do not believe that it affected their verdict. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance but 
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion with 
respect to the rule announced in People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 
504 [218 P.2d 981], in which case I dissented. I do not 
believe that the facts in the Woods case are analogous to 
the facts in the case at bar or that it is necessary to rely 
on the Woods case as authority for the conclusion reached 
in the case at bar. 
